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Over 650,000 people are released from prison in the United States every year, 
often to underserved neighborhoods with few 
resources to support reentry.1 For these newly 
released offenders, securing housing is one of  
the most important requirements for successful 
reentry, but it is also one of  the most difficult to 
meet. If  adequate, affordable housing cannot be 
found, people returning to their communities 
may end up homeless, recidivating (committing 
a new crime), and/or utilizing cost-intensive 
crisis services (shelters). These outcomes are 
detrimental to the individual, communities 
they are returning to, and government budgets; 
therefore, policies are needed to support reentry 
housing. In this article, I will begin with a 
literature review that establishes the difficulties 
returning offenders face in finding housing. I 
will then examine promising models to ensure 
housing for returning offenders from Washington 
State, New York City, and Ohio. Based on the 
outcomes of  these model programs, I will make 
policy recommendations for local, state, and the 
federal government. 
Obstacles to Securing Housing
There is extensive literature on the challenges 
facing formerly incarcerated individuals when 
returning to their communities, and housing is 
chief  among them. Housing also plays a role in 
In the United States, individuals returning home from prison face serious obstacles securing affordable, stable housing. Without 
appropriate housing, applying for jobs, obtaining needed social services, and successfully reintegrating to their communities becomes 
nearly impossible. Furthermore, a lack of  stable housing is a predictor for recidivism and homelessness, which places pressure on 
municipal budgets. Because no one agency or level of  government sees housing for returning offenders as its responsibility, there 
has been little action on or attention to this problem. In this article, I first review the literature describing the barriers returning 
offenders face in securing housing, including legal prohibitions, limited family support, and fragmented social service delivery. 
Then, I examine policy models to address these problems in Washington State, New York City, and Ohio. Based on the results of  
these programs, I conclude with policy recommendations, including removing barriers to public housing based on past offending, 
search assistance programs for returning offenders, improving coordination across the criminal justice system and post-release service 
providers, and revitalizing neighborhoods that support high levels of  returning offenders.
either mitigating or exacerbating difficulties in 
other areas—treating mental illness and substance 
abuse, securing employment and reliable 
transportation, reintegrating in communities, and 
accessing social services are all more difficult in 
the absence of  stable housing. 
Family members are a primary source of  housing 
support for individuals upon release, but this is 
not a long-term solution and may not be available 
to many individuals.2 Family members may be 
unable or unwilling to house offenders upon their 
release, or offenders may not have family in the 
community they return to. Probation restrictions 
also often prohibit returning offenders from living 
with a family member if  that family member has 
their own criminal history.3
If  family is unavailable, returning offenders 
may then turn to public housing as a safety net. 
However, returning offenders may be barred, 
temporarily or permanently, from utilizing 
public housing. Despite former U.S. Department 
of  Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
Secretary Shaun Donovan encouraging public 
housing authorities (PHAs) to remove bans based 
on criminal history, many local PHAs still use 
these blanket bans.4 Even if  policies do change, 
those with a criminal background may not be 
aware and thus may not reapply. 
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required by special needs populations (illiteracy, 
mental illness, substance abuse, etc.) among 
released prisoners, as part of  its mission.9 This 
results in returning offenders falling through the 
social service “cracks,” and an increase in use of  
crisis services such as homeless shelters. 
Policy Models for Housing 
Returning Offenders
Recognizing the issues described in the previous 
section, many state and local governments have 
taken the lead on designing policies to address the 
challenges returning offenders face in securing 
housing, staying in their housing, and remaining 
out of  the criminal justice system. However, there 
is little quantitative evidence on the outcomes 
of  these programs, as many are still quite new. 
In the following sections, I will examine what 
evaluations do exist for reentry housing vouchers 
and reentry supportive housing in Washington 
State, and Frequent Users Systems Engagement 
in New York City and Ohio, as three promising 
programs to address returning offenders’ needs. 
Vouchers and Reentry 
Housing in Washington State
Washington State has experimented with 
two different models for providing housing to 
returning offenders—a reentry housing voucher 
program through the Department of  Corrections, 
and a supportive housing program called the 
Reentry Housing Pilot Program.
Department of  Corrections Housing 
Voucher Program (HVP)
Before 2009, inmates who were about to be 
released but could not establish adequate housing 
arrangements were held in prison past their 
earned release date (ERD, early release for good 
Without family or friend support, or public 
housing, returning offenders have few other 
options. Upon release, returning offenders 
have little to no income to find private housing. 
Those with criminal convictions face the same 
challenges in securing affordable housing 
faced by many people across the country, but 
with additional barriers due to their criminal 
backgrounds. Many cities have increasingly tight 
rental markets, with even fewer units available for 
low-income housing, and when landlords can be 
selective, they are less likely to choose someone 
with a criminal background.5 Although recent 
(April 2016) guidance from HUD stated that 
landlords who refuse to rent to someone based 
on a criminal conviction violate the Fair Housing 
Act,6 it is unlikely that discrimination in the 
housing market has disappeared without strong 
enforcement. 
Difficulty in finding housing puts returning 
offenders at risk of  homelessness, and 
homelessness in turn increases the risk of  
reincarceration.7 In a 2004 study of  over 45,000 
released prisoners in New York State (released to 
New York City), 11.4 percent utilized a homeless 
shelter post-release, and 32.8 percent experienced 
another term in prison. This proportion was even 
higher for black offenders at 12.9 percent and 
34.6 percent respectively.8 Both previous shelter 
stays and periods of  incarceration were associated 
with a higher likelihood of  subsequent shelter or 
prison time. Interestingly, the study found that the 
risk for homelessness decreases after the initial 
two-months post release, suggesting that housing 
services are most needed immediately upon 
release.
These challenges are exacerbated by a 
fragmented service delivery system for the 
formerly incarcerated, in which no one agency 
views the provision of  long-term housing for 
returning offenders, or additional services 
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be constructed with offenders released at the 
same time as HVP participants. Instead, the 
researchers used a historical comparison group 
of  inmates who had ERDs in the 18 months 
before HVP’s implementation and were held 
past their ERDs due to lack of  housing. The 
comparison group was statistically identical to the 
HVP participants group on key characteristics (a 
“quasi-experimental” design). The researchers 
tested both the impact of  HVP on recidivism and 
community supervision violations, as well as the 
cost savings realized. 
The study found that there were no significant 
differences between HVP participants and 
the control group in recidivism rates. Because 
the study compared HVP participants to the 
status-quo alternative of  staying in prison past 
their ERD, it would not be possible for HVP 
participants to have lower recidivism rates than 
the comparison group of  individuals still in prison 
(therefore unable to recidivate). Therefore, the 
researchers considered a finding of  no significant 
differences between the groups to be a sign 
of  success. Providing vouchers to reentering 
individuals, instead of  additional time in prison, 
did not increase risks to public safety. Hamilton 
et al. also found that HVP was less expensive (in 
terms of  average costs per offender) than holding 
prisoners past ERD—every dollar invested in the 
HVP program saved WADOC over $7. Because 
the purpose of  the study was to determine cost-
effectiveness, not impact on housing outcomes, 
the broader impact that stable, independent 
housing has on the returning offender in terms 
of  housing success or reintegration was not 
measured.
These results, while promising, have several 
important limitations. First, the HVP is offered 
only to a small subset of  returning offenders. 
It is impossible to estimate the program’s 
effectiveness if  expanded to include all those 
behavior) until such arrangements could be 
made. To address this problem, the Washington 
State Legislature and Department of  Corrections 
implemented the Earned Release Date Housing 
Voucher Program (ERD HVP). Under the 
program, which began in 2009, prisoners who 
could not find post-release housing could request 
housing vouchers, which pay up to $500 per 
month towards rent in private housing for up 
to three months.10 The payments are made 
directly to landlords, ensuring the assistance is 
spent only on rent. In 2012, only 12 percent 
of  releases (about 1,000 vouchers every year) 
received a voucher, due to the limited eligibility 
of  the program.11 This program had the benefit 
of  securing housing before the offender was 
released, therefore ensuring they were housed 
during the highest-risk period for homelessness. 
Because only returning prisoners who have 
earned early release—and are subject to 
community supervision post-release—are 
required to have an approved release plan 
(with housing being an essential factor), they 
are the only prisoners eligible for the HVP. It 
was expected that this program would save the 
State money in holding prisoners beyond their 
ERD, and would also result in better outcomes 
for prisoners returning home.12 Because the 
program released prisoners to private, individual 
housing, participants in the HVP were subject to 
additional community supervision requirements 
to make up for the lack of  resources and support 
present in transitional housing or living with their 
family. 
The Washington Department of  Corrections 
(WADOC) began accepting applications in 
July 2009. In 2013, Hamilton, Kigerl, and 
Hays conducted a study that compared HVP 
participants to a matched control group.13 
Because the HVP provided vouchers to nearly 
all applicants, a comparison group could not 
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leaving prison without appropriate housing, but 
this kind of  analysis is important to conduct 
before implementation in other locations. Second, 
because this was not the study’s focus, we do not 
know the housing outcomes for HVP participants 
in the long term. When designing a program 
to meet the needs of  returning offenders, it is 
critical to ensure that the program does not 
leave them in a similar, or worse, position then 
they would have been otherwise. WADOC 
asserts that HVP prevents participants from 
becoming homeless (because it provides housing 
immediately upon release), but the evaluation 
conducted by Hamilton et al. does not study 
that outcome, and there is no data to suggest the 
success rate of  these housing placements. More 
research is needed to determine if  the three 
months of  vouchers was enough for participants 
to get back on their feet. Third, it is likely a 
voucher program such as this would be less 
effective in a tighter housing market. In a tight 
housing market, in which landlords can more 
easily reject applicants, participants will have to 
deal with the double stigma of  a criminal history 
and a voucher. WADOC attempted to correct 
for this by paying the voucher amount directly 
to the landlord, thereby eliminating the possible 
concern that the participant will use the subsidy 
irresponsibly. Again, this was not a focus of  the 
Hamilton et al. study, so we do not know any 
difficulties participants faced in securing affording 
housing. This is another aspect of  the program 
that will need to be examined more closely before 
implementation elsewhere. 
Reentry Housing Pilot Program (RHPP)
Recognizing that “stable, habitable, and 
supportive housing is a critical factor that 
increases a previously incarcerated individual’s 
access to treatment and services as well as 
the likelihood of  success in the community,” 
the Washington State Legislature created the 
Reentry Housing Pilot Program (RHPP) in 
2007.14 The program was targeted to high-risk, 
high-need individuals about to be released from 
prison without stable housing to return to. It 
provided up to a year of  housing support for 
returning individuals who were willing to undergo 
counseling (for drug abuse, mental health, etc.) 
and who were willing to find stable employment 
and work toward independence. Failure to meet 
expectations in these areas resulted in termination 
from the program. Pilot programs were 
established in three counties (Clark [Vancouver], 
King [Seattle], and Spokane), and were operated 
by the counties’ existing Community Justice 
Centers (CJCs). The CJCs already served as a 
“one-stop shop” for both post-release supervision 
and reentry services, and therefore were able 
to utilize well-established relationships between 
corrections, law enforcement, and treatment 
providers to facilitate service delivery. 
In the housing realm, each county identified 
housing units, offered renters rights courses, and 
coordinated safety plans to address potential 
issues with landlords and the community 
due to ex-offender behavior.15 While RHPP’s 
implementation differed slightly across counties 
based on the conditions and resources available in 
each location, these differences had no significant 
effects on program delivery. Lutze, Rosky, and 
Hamilton conducted an evaluation of  RHPP 
to estimate RHPP’s impact on participants 
compared to a sample of  community corrections 
(traditional parole) participants matched on key 
factors as a control group.16
The researchers found that participation in 
RHPP was associated with fewer recidivism 
events, and participants were less likely to 
experience one or more periods of  homelessness 
(see Figure 1). The RHPP group also experienced 
lower rates of  revocation and readmission, but 
those outcomes were not statistically significant. 
Furthermore, their results also add to the existing 
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evidence that housing instability and periods of  
homelessness increase the chances of  recidivism, 
and that the RHPP program was shown to 
reduce the effect a homelessness event had on 
recidivism risk. Despite these promising results, 
the program was cut before its cost effectiveness 
was evaluated due to budget constraints caused 
by the Great Recession. Additionally, 41 percent 
of  program participants were terminated from 
the program, due mostly to noncompliance with 
the RHPP rules. These participants’ outcomes 
were still incorporated in the RHPP treatment 
group outcome measures, which demonstrates 
that the program was successful even with many 
participants eventually terminated. Nevertheless, 
this high termination rate is problematic, 
and if  other locations choose to implement a 
similar program in the future, how to increase 
compliance with the program will need to be 
further explored. 
Additionally, certain aspects of  the RHPP 
program make it difficult to generalize the results 
to other locations and populations. First, it was 
conducted only in the three most populous 
counties in Washington. The resources available 
in these cities (financial, political, and structural) 
are likely higher than in rural areas; therefore, it is 
questionable if  these wraparound services can be 
provided similarly in less densely populated areas. 
Similarly, because an already well-established 
“one-stop shop” for reentry services conducted 
the program, it was likely implemented more 
seamlessly than in a city that would have to 
establish relationships between several agencies 
and nonprofit service providers. Because 
the program lasted only one year, long-term 
outcomes were not observed. 
Most significantly, because the program offered 
wraparound services that went beyond housing, 
it is impossible to determine whether it was 
the housing itself  that produced the positive 
outcomes, or if  it was the combination of  
services. This distinction may not matter to cities 
considering a program like RHPP, as long as it 
achieves its goals (reduced recidivism, etc.). But 
because the cost effectiveness of  this program 
has not been studied, it may be that providing 
the services is more costly than the benefit they 
provide to society. In that case, it would be worth 
determining whether the housing without services 
could produce the same outcome as housing with 
services (or even service delivery alone), but with 
fewer costs. 
Frequent Users Systems 
Engagement
The Center for Supportive Housing (CSH) 
developed the Frequent Users Systems 
Engagement (FUSE) model to break the 
cycle of  homelessness, recidivism, and health 
challenges of  “super utilizers.” Super utilizers 
are individuals that have repeated periods of  
homelessness and incarceration, and may also 
frequently use other crisis service systems such 
as the emergency room and inpatient mental 
health or substance abuse treatment facilities.17 
The model was first implemented in New York 
City and has since been expanded to over 20 
communities across the country. Under the FUSE 
model, communities identify and place super 
utilizers in permanent supportive housing, in 
which health care, substance abuse treatment, 
and other social services (mental health, job 
training, etc.) are provided either on site or 
through coordinated scattered sites. The goal is 
that this supportive housing will not only result 
in better outcomes for those served, but also 
reduce costs to the crisis service systems. In 2006, 
CSH began the “Returning Home” initiative to 
support communities using the FUSE model. 
Early evaluation results have shown both positive 
impacts for participants and cost savings to local 
governments. As of  December 2014, Returning 
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post-treatment results were 91 percent and 28 
percent respectively). Furthermore, FUSE II 
participants spent 146.7 fewer days in homeless 
shelters, and the number of  those with any time 
in a shelter over the two year study period was 
reduced by 70 percent on average. The study 
also found statistically significant and positive 
effects on recidivism rates, crisis care services 
use, and health outcomes (see Figure 1). Lastly, 
the researchers found that FUSE II resulted in 
significant cost savings to the corrections and 
homelessness systems, and that those costs offset 
over 60 percent of  the public costs for the housing 
and services provided.
FUSE in Ohio
Unlike New York City’s, Ohio’s FUSE pilot 
program—called Returning Home Ohio 
(RHO)—targeted those who were about 
to be released from prison, had a disability 
(developmental, addiction, behavioral), and were 
homeless at the time of  their incarceration or at 
risk of  homelessness upon release. Participants in 
RHO received pre-release reentry planning, and 
upon release, were provided supportive housing 
(either single or scattered site) through one of  
nine providers in Dayton, Cincinnati, Cleveland, 
Columbus, or Toledo. Because RHO was run at 
the state level, the implementation details such as 
target population, housing model (single versus 
scattered site), and exclusionary criteria varied by 
community, depending on the provider facilitating 
housing and service delivery.21
Fontaine et al. used a quasi-experimental 
design to determine the impact RHO had on 
reducing residential instability and recidivism 
among program participants. A treatment 
group of  121 participants was compared to a 
118-person comparison group during a one-
year follow-up period. Due to the few observed 
homeless incidents (measured by shelter use), 
Home has created 1,500 new re-entry supportive 
housing units across the country, and advocated 
for federal and state policy changes to better 
serve super utilizers.18 In the following sections, 
I will review the outcomes of  two quantitative 
evaluations of  FUSE programs, one at the local 
level (New York City) and one at the state level 
(Ohio). 
FUSE II in New York City
In New York City, the FUSE program targeted 
individuals who had at least four jail and four 
shelter stays over five years, and had either 
received substance abuse treatment within the 
past 12 months, had no recent alcohol or drug 
use problem, or had serious mental health 
issues that had been treated in the past year. 
Participants received permanent supportive 
housing and paid no more than 30 percent of  
their income (or housing allowance) on rent.19 
The program was evaluated to determine the 
effect on participants (retention in permanent 
housing, avoiding homelessness, and various 
health and mental health outcomes), as well as 
the program’s cost-effectiveness, using a treatment 
group of  60 FUSE II participants and 70 
comparison individuals. Both groups were tracked 
for two years following the treatment (placement 
in housing) using a combination of  surveys and 
data from the New York City Departments of  
Corrections and Homeless Services. 
Aidala et al. found that at both one year 
and two years post-treatment, FUSE II 
participants had statistically significant and 
more positive permanent housing outcomes 
than the comparison group.20 After two years, 
86 percent of  FUSE participants were in 
permanent housing, compared to only 42 
percent of  the comparison group (the one-year 
85AGORA 11
Rachel Baccile
the researchers could not conduct a multivariate 
comparison of  this outcome. Researchers did 
find that RHO participants were significantly less 
likely to have a recidivistic event or were less likely 
to be incarcerated. In the cost-benefit analysis, 
these outcomes resulted in a decrease in the 
average criminal justice cost per person. However, 
RHO participants had much higher mental 
health and other service costs. This resulted in a 
net increase in spending of  $9,500 per person per 
year on average. Fontaine et al. assert that these 
increased net costs are consistent with programs 
aimed at increasing human capital, as they are 
“by definition, more costly than business as usual, 
particularly in the short-term.”22 Additionally, 
this could have been due to the need to establish 
communication and collaboration between 
agencies and service providers that had not 
previously worked together, and could therefore 
decline in later years. Lastly, the benefits of  RHO 
may have been understated due to inconsistency 
in program “benefit” (actual housing services) 
delivery across the different pilot locations—some 
locations struggled to integrate all services across 
providers for the participants. Therefore, the 
researchers posit that over a longer-term follow-
up period, the net value of  RHO may increase to 
a “break even” or cost-savings point. 
Takeaways of  the FUSE Program
Similar to Washington’s RHPP program, it is 
difficult to determine how the FUSE model could 
ameliorate the challenges faced by returning 
offenders generally. The comprehensive services 
provided in the FUSE model that make it so 
successful at addressing the needs of  super 
utilizers (both for individuals’ housing and health 
level and for cost savings) also make it unlikely 
to be necessary or cost-effective for the average 
released offender. Not all returning offenders 
have the serious mental health, substance abuse, 
or homelessness problems that require such 
robust services. Moreover, the differential impact 
of  the housing by itself, without supportive 
services, cannot be determined. Furthermore, 
the coordination it requires between government 
agencies and nonprofit service providers may 
not be feasible in non-urban locations, and 
establishing this coordination may be costly in the 
short-term. However, the FUSE model’s success 
does demonstrate that housing for formerly 
incarcerated individuals reduces recidivism, 
which in turn generates cost savings for, at the 
very least, the criminal justice system. There will 
likely be greater cost savings in locations with 
an established collaboration between service 
providers and the criminal justice system. These 
cost savings may prove to be a politically feasible 
avenue for funding affordable housing and 
services for returning offenders. 
Policy Recommendations
The programs in Washington, New York City, 
and Ohio give us several best practices for 
designing programs for improving housing 
services for returning offenders. Though these 
programs are narrowly targeted to specific 
populations, we know nearly all of  those released 
from prison face similar difficulties in securing 
housing. Because the reentry population has 
such varied needs, from short-term housing 
immediately upon release, to long-term, 
supportive housing with wraparound services, 
a program aimed at housing provision for this 
population will require multiple components. 
Therefore, it will require coordination between 
all levels of  government; criminal justice, housing, 
and social service agencies; and nonprofits.
To tailor a comprehensive reentry housing 
program to local housing market conditions, local 
governments will have to be responsible for the 
details of  program design and implementation. 
The federal government delegates the 
distribution of  housing funds, such as Section 
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8 and Community Development Block Grants, 
because of  local officials’ expertise on their 
communities’ needs. One step local governments 
can take to make securing housing easier for 
returning offenders is to increase access to 
existing units. For instance, governments can 
partner with landlords to implement a search 
assistance program that connects returning 
offenders and landlords willing to work with 
them. Such a program would look similar to 
the RHPP program in Washington, with service 
providers serving as a liaison between returning 
offenders and landlords (providing safety plans, 
unit identification, etc.). This type of  program 
would be most beneficial for returning offenders 
without significant underlying issues that require 
more intensive wraparound services. It would 
be particularly valuable in the private housing 
market where landlords are selective and do not 
have a mission to serve disadvantaged groups 
(as opposed to a nonprofit providing supportive 
housing). Working to establish relationships 
with landlords and returning offenders could 
improve the community’s perception of  returning 
offenders, thereby improving chances for 
successful reintegration. It may also be possible 
for cities to leverage these landlord partnerships 
to purposefully locate returning offenders in 
communities with more resources (jobs, transit, 
social services) and lower crime rates. It would be 
important that prisoners receive search assistance 
before release, to ensure that returning offenders 
are housed during the highest-risk post-release 
period for homelessness (immediately upon 
release to two months). For those that cannot 
secure private housing, but have relatively fewer 
needs for wraparound services, cities should 
remove barriers to entering public housing and 
obtaining housing vouchers. 
Local governments could also partner with 
nonprofits to increase the stock of  housing units, 
specifically for the reentry population with high 
needs for social services, as in the FUSE model. 
These units could be new or converted from 
existing units. This approach requires enlisting 
the nonprofit service providers to provide the 
wraparound services associated with the units. 
Establishing permanent supportive housing is 
cost intensive, and may therefore only be an 
option for well-resourced communities that have 
many services available within the immediate 
geographic area.
Another, broader approach cities could take 
is to focus on revitalizing the underserved 
neighborhoods (with a focus on affordable 
housing provision) many offenders return home 
to.23 This has the benefit of  impacting a larger 
group of  people also in need of  investment, and 
limiting the negative effect that stigmas around 
those with criminal histories can have on public 
support for the program. It would also go the 
furthest in addressing the root causes of  criminal 
behavior, recidivism, and homelessness. However, 
these root causes are intractable problems 
cities have been grappling with for decades 
and will therefore require more complex policy 
solutions than some of  the targeted interventions 
discussed here. And while returning offenders 
would likely be better off returning home to 
more well-resourced neighborhoods, without 
targeted, intensive services, many of  the returning 
offenders with the most needs will continue to fall 
through the service delivery cracks. Furthermore, 
benefits from such development will take several 
years to materialize, and could accrue inequitably. 
States and the federal government can act 
on returning offender housing in several 
ways. First, they can fund local governments’ 
efforts in increasing the reentry housing stock 
and neighborhood revitalization, and create 
incentives for doing so. Without support from 
the state, it is likely that the costs associated 
with housing returning offenders will fall more 
heavily on communities with large populations 
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of  returning offenders. This could result in 
services being unavailable in other parts of  the 
state, which could then lead to concentrated 
populations of  returning offenders in particular 
areas, or individuals falling through the cracks. 
Therefore, efforts should be made to engage 
service providers, landlords, and detention 
centers across the whole state. Second, states and 
the federal government could institute broad 
criminal justice reform that reduces the number 
of  individuals sent to prison each year, which 
will reduce the reentry population in the future. 
Shifting to favoring community-based sanctions 
over jail or prison allows offenders to retain their 
current community connections such as their 
housing or job(s), and perhaps establish new or 
better ties after linking community corrections to 
service providers. Lastly, states and HUD should 
continue encouraging (and consider incentivizing) 
local public housing authorities to eliminate 
barriers preventing returning offenders from 
accessing public housing. Again, this is unlikely 
to make a large impact for returning offenders in 
communities with already long waitlists for public 
housing or vouchers, but could serve as a signal 
that returning offenders do not deserve to be 
excluded from public services.
Lastly, all of  these levels of  government must 
work collaboratively with each other and 
nonprofit service providers. Creating a shared 
data system and establishing formal and informal 
communication channels between the various 
actors is a critical component of  facilitating 
collaboration. In the programs examined earlier, 
those that utilized existing partnerships between 
various agencies and nonprofits demonstrated 
better housing outcomes and cost effectiveness 
than those that were more fragmented. While 
coordination has obvious benefits, it can also be 
time consuming and challenging to build the 
interpersonal relationships and structural systems 
necessary to make these collaborations efficient 
and effective. It will therefore require patience 
from stakeholders and continuous evaluation of  
the process to ensure goals are met. 
Conclusion
Given President Trump’s recent executive 
orders aimed at cracking down on crime24 and 
campaign promises to restore “law and order,”25 
policymakers should prepare for an increase in 
incarceration and, consequently, an increase in 
offenders eventually returning home. Therefore, it 
is even more imperative to successfully reintegrate 
returning offenders to their communities, starting 
with stable housing. While the administration’s 
actions may exacerbate the needs for reentry 
services, it is unlikely to prioritize their funding. 
Consequently, cities and states should take what 
action they can without financial or political 
support from the federal government. For 
example, steps such as partnering with landlords 
in a search assistance program and removing 
barriers to public housing can be done with 
limited resources. 
Academic institutions should also take 
opportunities to conduct further research 
on additional reentry housing innovations 
to determine program impacts and cost-
effectiveness. The existing research is promising, 
but far from comprehensive. This could further 
discourage some policymakers from taking action 
when the political environment is less friendly. 
Therefore, it is critical for researchers, planners, 
and policy experts to continue evaluating 
innovations to support returning offenders, and to 
disseminate best practices to local communities.
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